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INTRODUCTION
American censuses do a better job of counting whites than they do
racial and ethnic minorities.1 Because America is a democracy, where
political clout inheres in numbers, this failure to count minorities
adequately poses fundamental problems.2 Indeed, census figures are
used to determine the distribution of political power in the
institutions that comprise the very heart of our democracy.3 First, the
435 seats in the House of Representatives are apportioned among the
states on the basis of population information provided by the Census
Bureau.4 Second, seats in Congress and state legislatures are
distributed within the states based on the population of towns and
counties as determined by the decennial census.5 Third, some $200
billion in federal funds and untold billions in state funds are

1. The phenomenon of counting the white population more accurately than non-white
populations is known as the “differential undercount.” See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS 32, 33 (Barry Edmonston & Charles Schultze eds., 1995)
[hereinafter MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS]. The most recent census failed to count 5.7% of
blacks, while it missed only 1.3% of whites. See id. at 32 (charting the undercount problems).
2. Indeed, the strength and durability of our democracy is rooted in the belief that
national decisions are made by elected officials acting as representatives for the people. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Who are to be the
electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned,
more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble
sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people
of the United States.”). Thus, if seats in our legislature are distributed on the basis of
population information that systematically undercounts certain minority groups, our system has
broken down.
3. See infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (describing the different uses to which
census data is put).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that seats in the House are to be distributed
among the states on the basis of population and that the population of each state is to be
determined every 10 years); 13 U.S.C. § 14(b) (1994) (stating that the census of the population
is required for the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives).
5. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 244 (noting that the states began to
use census data for federal and state redistricting in the 1960s). Unequal representation in the
House was pervasive prior to the 1960s. See id. Indeed, after reapportionment and redistricting
in 1960 the largest congressional district in the U.S. had over five times the population of the
smallest district, and the 20 most populous districts had a combined population of 14 million
compared with a combined population of 4.6 million for the 20 smallest districts. See id.
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allocated to states and cities each year on the basis of population.6
Accordingly, congressional apportionment and redistricting, and the
distribution of funds under many government programs will continue
to be carried out in an unjust manner if the American census does
not become more accurate.7
For the year 2000 census, the Clinton Administration (the
“Administration”) has proposed to ameliorate the problem of the
minority undercount by supplementing census figures with figures
determined by the use of statistical sampling.8 Under this proposal,
statistical sampling would be used in the census to extrapolate
information about the entire population from partial data.9 The
Administration decided to use statistical sampling in the census after
years of study by Census Bureau officials and at the behest of the
National Academy of Sciences and other statistics experts.10 Because
the census is of political as well as scientific concern, the
Administration’s plan has been the subject of two court challenges.11
6. See David Seidman, Note, Numbers That Count: The Law and Policy of Population Statistics
Used in Formula Grant Allocation Programs, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 229 (1980) (noting that
more than one hundred federal programs use total population or some segment of the
population as a factor in allocating federal funds). The following are two examples of the many
federal programs that require population information and thus, mandate the Census Bureau to
compile such information. First, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act requires data on
the poverty status of school-age children by school district to allocate education funds to poorer
districts. See 20 U.S.C. § 821 (1994). Second, the Department of Agriculture uses information
regarding the income for tracts and rural counties to allocate grant funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 1786
(1994); see also MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 24.
7. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 35 (“There are several implications
of the undercount for minority groups. In political representation and funding based on
population, undercounted groups get less credit for their population than they are due.”).
8. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS--THE PLAN
FOR CENSUS 2000, at 23 [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS] (defining “sampling” as using
information on a portion of the population to infer information about the population as a
whole). The Census Bureau claims that its plan will improve accuracy, save money, and
“eliminate the traditional undercount of children, renters, and minorities.” See id.
9. More specifically, the Census Bureau plans to use traditional methods to count 90% of
the households in a census tract—a neighborhood of about 1,700 dwellings. See Steven A.
Holmes, Court Voids Plan to Use Sampling for 2000 Census, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, at A1. Data
from the 90% of households would be used to determine the number and characteristics of the
remaining 10%. See id.
10. The Administration’s plan has been endorsed by panels at the National Academy of
Sciences, American Statistical Association, the American Sociological Association, the General
Accounting Office, and the Inspector General of the Department of Commerce. See REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 24.
11. See United States House of Representatives v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 78 (D.D.C. 1998) (involving a suit by the Republican-controlled House), dismissed
by, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999); Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548-49 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(involving a suit by individual citizens from counties in six states, including Representative Bob
Barr (R-Ga.)), aff’d sub nom. Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999). The Census Act is not entirely clear on the legality of
sampling. Indeed, § 141(a) and § 195 of the Census Act seem to contradict each other. Section
141(a) reads, in relevant part: “The Secretary shall take a decennial census of the
population . . . in such form and content as he may determine, including the use of sampling

1104

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1101

The politics of the census dispute are very simple.12 Democrats
seek to reform the census to count minority groups more accurately
because these groups tend to vote Democratic,13 while Republicans
oppose these reforms for exactly the same reason.14 Whatever the
motivations fueling the census debate, much of the battle can be
reduced to an issue of statutory construction: Does the Census Act
prohibit the Census Bureau from using statistical sampling to
supplement census figures compiled through traditional headcount
methods?15
This Comment explores the legality of the Administration’s plan
for the 2000 census and assesses the effect of a consistently inaccurate
census on the American body politic.
Part I examines the
undercount and the differential undercount problem and describes
the Administration’s proposed changes to the census. Part II
discusses the two court challenges to the Administration’s plan,
explaining how two lower courts and the Supreme Court reached the
conclusion that the use of statistical sampling for the purpose of
apportioning the House violates the Census Act. Part III argues that
the Supreme Court ruling represents only a limited setback for the
Administration and sampling proponents. Significantly, the ruling
makes the use of statistical sampling unlawful in connection with
apportionment, but does not prohibit the use of sampling-adjusted
procedures and special surveys.” 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1994). This language appears to
authorize the use of statistical sampling. Section 195 of the Census Act, however, states that
“[e]xcept for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of
Representatives in Congress among the several states, the Secretary shall . . . authorize the use
of the statistical method known as ‘sampling’ in carrying out the provisions of this title.” Id. §
195. This section appears to prohibit the use of statistical sampling in conducting the census
because census information is used to apportion seats in the House under the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
12. See Holmes, supra note 9, at A1 (noting that the issue has achieved heightened
importance because many believe that statistical sampling would count minority voters missed
under recent censuses and that counting them would produce new congressional and state
legislative districts likely to vote Democratic).
13. See id.
14. One editorial writer believes that:
The Republicans fear that a more precise count will turn up more immigrants,
minorities, the poor and the young, who are likely to swell population in urban centers
that lean toward the Democrats. But because an overt campaign against a fair count
would be unseemly and politically risky, the Republicans have seized upon the abstract
that sampling violates the constitutional requirement of ‘actual enumeration.’
Editorial, Impeding an Accurate Census, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, at A16.
15. Both the Glavin and the House of Representatives courts held that the Census Act was
determinative in the fight over sampling. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 104
(holding that the use of statistical sampling to determine the population for the purpose of the
apportionment of representatives in Congress among the states violates the Census Act); Glavin,
19 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (holding that “where section 195 is a specific statutory prohibition of
sampling for apportionment of Congress, it prevails over the more general provisions of section
141’s grant of authority to the Secretary”).
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census figures for other purposes.
Finally, Part IV makes
recommendations to the Administration, the states, and Congress
regarding ways to remedy the differential undercount problem in the
2000 census without violating the Census Act.
I. RECENT HISTORY OF THE CENSUS
There has never been a completely accurate census of the
American population.16 The fact that American censuses fail to count
some people—that they “undercount” the population—has been
known for over two centuries.17 More recently, we have learned that
American censuses not only undercount the population generally,
but they undercount racial minorities at higher rates than whites.18
The shortcomings of the census—and its successes as well—are the
product of censuses that attempted to count directly every person in
the country.19 In its plan for the 2000 census, the Administration
proposes to supplement census figures from this direct contact
method with figures derived from a series of surveys that involve the
use of a counting technique known as “statistical sampling.”20
A. The Undercount Problem
The undercount is neither a new nor a complex problem.21 An
16. “There have been twenty decennial censuses in the history of the United States.
Although each was designed with the goal of accomplishing an ‘actual Enumeration’ of the
population, no census is recognized as having been wholly successful in achieving that goal.”
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 5 (1996).
17. Beginning with America’s first census in 1790, observers have been skeptical about
census accuracy. See C. WRIGHT, HISTORY AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES CENSUS 16-17
(1900) (explaining how Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, was sure that many
Americans were not counted by the 1790 census); see also infra note 21 and accompanying text
(documenting America’s evolving views regarding census accuracy throughout our history).
18. The 1990 census missed 4.4% of African-Americans, 5.0% of Hispanics, and 12.2% of
American Indians living on reservations, while it missed only 0.7% of non-Hispanic whites. See
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 4 (charting the estimated net undercount of the 1990
census).
19. The census of 1790 was conducted by United States marshals, who were directed “to
visit every dwelling and count the individuals living there.” See id. at 1. By the end of the 19th
century, professional census-takers replaced marshals, but the job of taking the census still
involved enumerators visiting all households in the country. See id. (noting that professional
enumerators were used because the population was growing faster than the number of U.S.
marshals). For the portion of the census that involved counting the number of persons in the
country, census-takers continued to visit each household physically until 1970, when the Census
Bureau began using questionnaires in its “mail out/mail-back” procedure, followed by
enumerators visiting nonresponding households. See id. This basic structure for census data
collection did not change from 1970 through 1990. See id. at 2. Significantly, although there
were innovations in the census over the years, census-takers always made an effort to contact
directly—either by mail or in person—every household in the country. See id. at 1-2.
20. See infra Parts I.A, I.B (describing the factors that led the Administration to seek to
reform the census).
21. After the controversial census of 1790—in which Washington was sure the numbers
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“undercount” simply refers to the phenomenon where some
percentage of the people in the country at the time of the census are
not counted by the census. The United States first acknowledged the
extent of the undercount after the 1940 census,22 when it was
discovered that 5.4% of the population went uncounted.23 In each of
the four censuses that followed—the 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980
censuses—the undercount rate decreased,24 demonstrating that the
ability of the Census Bureau to count the entire population improved
over that period.25 In 1990, however, the undercount rate grew for
the first time since such records have been kept.26
The fact that a very small percentage of Americans are not counted
by the decennial census is neither surprising nor controversial.27
With an ever-growing population—now estimated at close to 270
million—it is unrealistic to expect census takers to count 100% of the

were undercounted because some people had “religious scruples” against a census, others
feared the imposition of a tax, and some of the officers responsible for the census had not done
their jobs properly—debates over undercounting disappeared for more than a century. See
HARVEY M. CHOLDIN, LOOKING FOR THE LAST PERCENT: THE CONTROVERSY OVER CENSUS
UNDERCOUNTS 42 (1994) (noting that in the 19th century and early 20th century, census
officials assumed that censuses counted all of the people). After the 1940 census, however, the
Bureau admitted that there had been an undercount—marking the beginning of a period
continuing to the present day in which the Census Bureau acknowledged that it cannot
accurately count the entire U.S. population. See id. at 42-43.
22. An early study of the undercount was aided greatly by the fact that in 1940, in addition
to the decennial census, there was also a compulsory registration of all males for the military
draft. See id. at 43 (noting that a comparison of the census figures and the draft figures reveal
that the draft had registered more men than the census had enumerated).
23. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 32 tbl. 2.1 (charting the
undercount for every census from 1940-1990).
24. See id. (showing that the undercount rate steadily decreased from 5.4% in 1940, to
4.1% in 1950, 3.1% in 1960, 2.7% in 1970, and 1.2% in 1980).
25. The steady decrease in the undercount rate took place as census administrators were
changing the process of census-taking in fundamental ways. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 8, at 1. The Census Bureau introduced two major innovations during this time. First, in
1940, the Bureau introduced its “short form” questionnaire, which posed several, very basic
questions to a household, for the majority of the population, leaving the “long form,” with
many more questions, for only a sample of the population. See id. Prior to 1940 all residents
had been asked to complete the “long form” questionnaire. See id. A second major innovation
came in 1970 when the Bureau introduced self-enumeration by mail. See id. Rather than send
an enumerator (a Census Bureau employee) to every household, the Bureau first mailed
questionnaires for households to fill out and mail back, and then sent enumerators only to nonresponding households. See id. The basic structure for census data collection has not changed
since this innovation in 1970. See id.
26. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 32 (showing that the 1990 census
undercounted 4.7 million people, or 1.8% of the U.S. population, while the 1980 census only
undercounted 2.8 million people, or 1.2% of the population).
27. One reason for the persistent undercount is that much of the population refuses to
cooperate with census-takers. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that only
65% of households mailed back their census questionnaires in the 1990 census). This
phenomenon should not be a surprise. Americans of the 1990s are busier, more mobile, more
likely to speak a primary language other than English, and more suspicious of government than
at most times in our history. See id. at 5.
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people in the country.28 Thus, although the undercount caused
concern over the years for census officials, academics, and interested
politicians, it was not a divisive problem.29 The same studies that
chart the persistent, relatively uncontroversial undercount problem
reveal another problem with U.S. censuses, however, and this
problem is both troubling and extremely controversial.30 The
undercount rate is not the same for all racial groups.31

28. The Census Bureau described how four basic characteristics of the American
population in the 1990’s hinder the work of census-takers. See id. First, the Census Bureau
noted that in 1990 “[a]n increasing number of Americans were too busy to be counted. The
number of people working more than one job had increased, along with the number of
multiple-worker families, so people were home less often when enumerators visited.” Id.
Second, the large amount of junk mail that Americans received obscured important documents
such as census forms. See id. Third, more Americans were living in housing that was remote or
inaccessible—including gated communities with uncooperative security guards. See id. Finally,
many Americans were “alienated from society in general and more distrustful of government in
particular.” Id. Although these new developments in American demographics have increased
the difficulty of census-taking, it has long been known that an entirely accurate census is
impossible to achieve. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 6 (1996) (recognizing
that although each census is designed “with the goal of achieving an ‘actual enumeration’ of
the population, no census is recognized as having been wholly successful in achieving that
goal”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (stating that “census data are inherently
less than absolutely accurate”).
29. See James Pack, The Census Adjustment Cases: The Hunt for the Wily Trout, 37 JURIMETRICS
J. 35, 36 (1996) (noting that an undercount spread evenly throughout the population would be
uncontroversial because it would have little impact on governmental use of the results). An
example of the non-partisan character of the general undercount problem is that there were
virtually no legal challenges to the manner in which the census was conducted until the 1970s.
See Seidman, supra note 6, at 232. Indeed, there were no court challenges to Census Bureau
procedures following the 1940, 1950, or 1960 censuses, even though after each of those three
censuses the Bureau admitted a significant undercount. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8,
at 2. In addition to the uncontroversial nature of the general undercount, the lack of legal
challenges may also stem from the widely held view that Census Bureau officials were perceived
as dispassionate professionals and not partisan. See CHOLDIN, supra note 21, at 16, 18
(describing the Census Bureau as the “cornerstone” of the government’s statistical “edifice,”
with a “highly educated, experienced, professional staff” that stands “apart from politics”).
30. One way to observe the controversy that the differential undercount problem has
brought to modern censuses is to review the amount of litigation surrounding the census. See
Sheldon T. Bradshaw, Death, Taxes, and Census Litigation: Do the Equal Protection and
Apportionment Clauses Guarantee a Constitutional Right to Census Accuracy?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
379, 380 (1996) (noting that 52 suits were filed against the Department of Commerce—the
cabinet department within which the Census Bureau operates—in connection with the 1980
census). The two suits at issue in this Comment, of course, exemplify the politicization of the
census. United States House of Representatives v. United States Department of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d
76, 78 (D.D.C. 1998), is a suit brought by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives
against the Administration, while Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548-49 (E.D. Va. 1998),
is a suit brought by residents of suburban congressional districts—among them Rep. Bob Barr
(R-Ga.).
31. “Since at least 1940, the Census Bureau has thought that the undercount affects some
racial and ethnic minority groups to a greater extent than it does whites.” Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at
7; see also Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Hear Case on Census Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1998, at A16 (noting that the political ramifications of the census debate stem from the fact that
although census takers miss millions of people—some four million in 1990—city dwellers, poor
people, and ethnic minorities in particular are missed out of proportion to their numbers).
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B. The Differential Undercount
Although nearly all of America’s white population is counted every
ten years,32 our censuses consistently fail to count a significant
percentage of the nation’s minority population.33 The minority
groups that are most often uncounted by the census are those that
live in America’s inner cities.34 The Census Bureau’s counting
problem is perhaps best understood as an inability to count
America’s urban population accurately,35 and not as an inability to
count racial minorities as such.36 Still, the problem is demonstrated
in racial terms because the survey methods used to determine the
undercount focus more on race than on whether the survey
participant lives in an urban, suburban, or rural community.37 And
undercount statistics by racial group—although maybe not as
illustrative as statistics comparing urban and suburban areas—are
nonetheless telling because racial minorities are more likely than
whites to live in the nation’s inner cities.38
Each of the country’s three largest minority groups is
undercounted at a rate higher than whites.39 This phenomenon is
known as the “differential undercount.”40 The undercount of
African-Americans has been documented for much longer than the
undercount for other minority groups.41 The African-American
undercount was first documented in 1940 and in each census since
that time, African-Americans have been undercounted at significantly
higher rates than whites.42 For example, the 1990 census failed to
32. A study by the National Academy of Sciences found that whites were undercounted at a
rate of 5% in 1940, 3.8% in 1950, 2.7% in 1960, 2.2% in 1970, 0.8% in 1980, and 1.3% in 1990.
See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 32.
33. See id. at 33-35 (explaining that the census consistently undercounts African-Americans,
Hispanics, and Asian-Americans).
34. See id. at 35 (explaining that “the people missed in the census are disproportionately
concentrated in larger cities”).
35. For example, states with large urban populations like California, New York, and Florida
had among the highest rates of undercount in the country. See id. at 35-36 (documenting the
level of undercount in every state in the country and characterizing the rate of undercount in
those states as “very high”).
36. But see id. at 35 (noting that “[s]tates with a population of the most undercounted
groups,” racial minorities, “tended to have higher net undercount rates”).
37. See id. at 31 (noting that the survey technique used to determine the undercount in the
1990 census, a method called “demographic analysis,” cannot provide estimates of the
undercount rate at the state or other sub-national levels).
38. See id. (explaining that states with the highest populations of minority groups were the
states with the highest rates of undercount).
39. See id. at 33-35 (noting that African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans are
consistently undercounted).
40. See Pack, supra note 29, at 36 (defining “differential undercount” as the high
concentration of the undercount among racial and ethnic minorities).
41. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 4.
42. The census missed 8.4% of African-Americans in 1940, 7.5% in 1950, 6.6% in 1960,
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count 5.7% of the African-American population, but missed only
0.7% of whites.43 Asian-Americans and Hispanic-Americans also are
undercounted at rates significantly higher than whites.44 Unlike the
general undercount rate, which basically has been in consistent
decline since scientists began measuring it, the differential
undercount was greater in the 1990 census than it was in the 1940
census. 45
The differential undercount is thought to be the result of several
factors.46 First, minorities in the nation’s urban centers are believed
to change residences more often than the rest of the population.47
Second, undercounted groups are thought generally to be more
suspicious of the government and therefore, less willing to respond to
mailed census questionnaires and less vigilant about ensuring that
they are counted by census takers knocking on doors.48 In addition to
these problems associated with counting urban populations, census
experts attribute the undercount of Asian and Hispanic groups to the
fact that some members of these groups do not speak English and
therefore, are less likely to understand census questionnaires and
procedures.49
The differential undercount problem is more troubling than the
undercount of the population as a whole because the consistent
undercounting of minority groups threatens to make hollow the most
basic promises of our democracy.50 Unlike other nations whose
6.5% in 1970, 4.5% in 1980, and 5.7% in 1990. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note
1, at 32.
43. See id. (noting that the 1990 census missed 5.7% of African-Americans, while it failed to
count only 1.3% of “nonblacks”). The Census Bureau, meanwhile, states that the 1990 census
missed 4.4% of African-Americans and 0.7% of non-Hispanic whites. See REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 8, at 4.
44. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 34 (explaining that the undercount
of these groups “is likely to have been influenced by the relatively large numbers who are
foreign born, people who may not have understood census questionnaires and procedures”).
45. The differential undercount rate was 4.4% in 1990, while it was 3.4% in 1940. See id. at
32. Unfortunately, if the Census Bureau does not reform its enumerating procedures this trend
is likely to continue in light of the rapid growth in the population of people more likely to be
left uncounted. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 5.
46. Some of the reasons that have been given for a greater undercount among minority
populations are: “[P]overty, lack of education, language communication problems between
respondents and enumerators, irregular living arrangements, and fear of revealing information
about family that may jeopardize eligibility for government income programs.” Abby L. Jennis,
The Census Undercount: Issues of Adjustment, 18 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 381, 382 n.10 (1984).
47. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 5-6 (noting that the groups most likely to be
left uncounted by the census tend to be “highly mobile”).
48. See id. at 6 (explaining that neighborhoods with high undercount rates tend to possess
conditions “that lead to resistance to outsiders, concealment to protect resources, and disbelief
of census confidentiality”).
49. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 34.
50. The differential undercount results in a systematic deprivation of political power. “In
political representation and funding based on population, undercounted groups get less credit
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strength and vitality derive from the common heritage of their
populations, America’s strength is rooted in the people’s shared faith
in certain ideas. Among the most fundamental of these ideas is the
idea that all persons are to be represented equally.51 It is impossible,
however, for our elected leaders to represent all persons equally if we
do not first accurately determine the racial and ethnic composition of
the American population.
Thus, America is not true to its
commitment to political equality when racial minorities are
consistently undercounted at rates disproportionate to whites.52
In addition, the differential undercount causes inequities that are
more tangible as well.
These problems include the underrepresentation of minority communities in Congress and in state
legislatures,53 and the inequitable distribution of funds under
government programs to minority communities.54
A perfect example of the myriad inequities that the Administration
is seeking to rectify through the use of sampling in the census can be
seen in the city of Hartford, Connecticut.55 As the city with the sixth
highest rate of undercount in the 1990 census, Hartford’s
predominantly minority population was undercounted by about
6,500 persons.56 The 6,500 person undercount has resulted in
Hartford losing a seat in the state legislature and receiving
for their population than they are due.” Id. at 35 (noting that minority areas have fewer elected
representatives at the federal, state, and local level than their numbers demand). This state of
affairs is antithetical to the idea of political equality upon which America is based. In what has
been called the “seminal statement of the American Creed,” JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX,
THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 54 (1997), Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of
Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain [inherent and] inalienable Rights; that among
these are life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
51. Justice Douglas summed up the principle of equal representation with his simple, yet
extremely powerful “one person, one vote” formulation when he stated that “[t]he conception
of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one
person, one vote.” Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1962).
52. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining how the differential undercount
is incongruous with the fundamental American ideal of political equality).
53. See infra Part III.B (outlining the effect of the differential undercount on the political
representation of undercounted groups).
54. See infra Part III.A (documenting the effect of the differential undercount on the
distribution of funds under government programs).
55. See Barbara Vobejda, In Hartford, Census Sampling Could Count for A Lot–In Added Aid,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1999, at A6 (describing the effects of the undercount in the 1990 census
on the city of Hartford and detailing the potential benefits to the city of a sampling-adjusted
census).
56. See id. (explaining that Hartford’s undercount in the 1990 census was determined by a
survey conducted after the census).
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approximately $5 million less each year from the federal government
than it would if the city’s population was accurately counted by the
census.57 That $5 million in federal aid would come in the form of
homes for people with low incomes, child care centers, and more
social service programs that bring food to the elderly and counsel
victims of domestic violence.58 Additionally, if Hartford’s true
population is counted by the 2000 census, state aid to the city will
increase significantly.59 The fact that federal and state assistance of
this kind is needed in Hartford—America’s eighth poorest city60—is
poignant and important. The central concern of this Comment,
however, is that cities receive their appropriate share of funds under
federal population-based programs and their deserved level of
representation in Congress and state legislatures.61 The full extent of
these problems, and the manner in which the Administration’s plan
to use statistical sampling in the census could potentially ameliorate
them, will be explored in later sections of this Comment.62
C. The Administration’s Plan for the 2000 Census
In the upcoming 2000 census, the Administration plans to alter
significantly traditional census-taking procedures in an attempt to
produce a more accurate census, and in so doing remedy the
differential undercount problem.63
Previous censuses have
determined the characteristics of the U.S. population solely on the
basis of direct contact between census administrators and U.S.
households.64 This method of census data collection has two parts.
The Census Bureau mails questionnaires to households for
inhabitants to fill out and mail back and then sends enumerators only

57. See id.
58. See id.
59. The infusion of state funds would have almost as significant an impact as the federal
funds. The 1990 census failed to count 2,228 Hartford children. See id. Had they been
counted, Hartford would have four more schools and 155 new teachers under state populationbased programs. See id.
60. See id.
61. See infra Parts III.A, III.B (documenting the vast sums of money at stake under federal
and state population-based programs and the potential shift in political representation that
could result from a sampling-adjusted census).
62. See infra Parts III, IV (describing the effect of the differential undercount on the
allocation of funds under government programs and the drawing of congressional and state
legislative districts, and the potential impact of a sampling-adjusted census on these problems).
63. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at ix.
64. See id. at x (describing the manner of census-taking where specific individuals
communicate with Census Bureau officials either through the mail or in person as “physical
enumeration”).
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to households that fail to return questionnaires.65 In each recent
census, the Bureau has spent increasing amounts of money to
heighten public awareness about the importance of being counted by
the census, and to hire the number of enumerators necessary to
collect information adequately from the ever-growing list of
households that do not respond to the mailed questionnaires.66
Despite the increased efforts of the Census Bureau, the undercount
and differential undercount problems persist.67 In the 1990 census—
the most expensive census in history68—the undercount rate grew for
the first time since 1940 and the differential undercount was greater
than it has ever been.69
The Administration’s plan for the 2000 census is based on the
assumption that the traditional model of census-taking is
fundamentally flawed.70 The Census Bureau believes the direct
contact method is both inherently incapable of accurately counting
the entire population, and particularly ill-prepared to count the
diverse and mobile American population of today.71 The Census
Bureau and sampling proponents point to the 1990 census as support
for their critique of the direct contact model.72 Despite the Census
Bureau’s unprecedented efforts to count everyone through the direct
contact method, the 1990 census resulted in a greater rate of general
undercount than the 1980 census,73 and was less successful at
counting minorities and other inner-city populations than previous
65. See id. at 1-2 (noting that this basic structure did not change from 1970, when the
Census Bureau introduced self-enumeration by mail, through 1990).
66. For example, the 1990 census cost more money than any previous census, employing
more than half a million people around the country to collect information from the
approximately 36 million addresses that did not respond by mail. See id. at 4. Also, the Census
Bureau spent approximately $125 million on advertising campaigns directed at minority
communities, those areas with the greatest risk of a large undercount. See id.
67. See supra Parts I.A, I.B (documenting the development of the undercount and the
differential undercount problems).
68. The 1990 census cost $25 per housing unit. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at
5. On an inflation adjusted basis, the 1970 census had cost only $11 per housing unit and the
1980 census $20 per housing unit. See id.
69. The undercount rate grew to 1.8% in 1990 from 1.2% in 1980, while the differential
undercount was 4.4% in 1990. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 32.
70. The Report to Congress claims that:
It is fruitless to continue trying to count every last person with traditional census
methods of physical enumeration. Simply providing additional funds to enable the
Census Bureau to carry out the 2000 Census using traditional methods, as it has in
previous Censuses, will not lead to improved coverage or data quality.
See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 7 (citing MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra
note 1).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 2 (stating that the results of the 1990 census demonstrate that new methods
are needed).
73. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 32 (documenting the growth in the
general undercount).
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censuses.74
The Administration’s plan for the 2000 census assumes that the
traditional direct contact method alone will not count these groups
adequately.75 The unique characteristics of today’s urban population
make direct contact census-taking less effective.76 According to the
Administration, the direct contact model is flawed because large
numbers of minorities are either incapable of cooperating with
census officials or are unwilling to do so.77 This lack of cooperation
exists because the nation’s minority population is more likely to be
mobile, speak a language other than English in the home, live in
nontraditional housing arrangements, or live in neighborhoods
where there is a resistance to outsiders, particularly government
officials.78 Thus, the Administration plans to supplement the results
of the traditional headcount with statistical sampling.
The Administration plans to use a statistical sampling methodology
in the 2000 census in three phases,79 where information on a portion
of the population will be used to infer information on the population
as a whole.80 First, the Census Bureau plans to use this methodology
in the “Postal Vacancy Check” phase of the census.81 In this phase,
census administrators seek to determine which of the households
listed as vacant by the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) are
unoccupied.82 To correct anticipated errors in the USPS list, the
Census Bureau will send interviewers to one out of every ten of the
housing units that the USPS indicates as vacant.83 The number of
housing units found occupied and the number of people living there
will be used to estimate the total population of homes initially
74. See id. (noting that the differential undercount in 1990 was 4.4%).
75. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 7 (calling it “fruitless” to try to count
accurately the whole population through the traditional direct contact method).
76. The Census Bureau found that the population of people more likely to be left
uncounted has grown more rapidly than the total population. See id. at 6. Communities with
high undercount rates tend to have the following characteristics to a greater degree than the
rest of the country: high level of mobility, language barriers, nontraditional housing
arrangements, and neighborhood conditions that tend to lead to resistance to outsiders. See id.
at 7.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 6 (“Because higher proportions of the nation’s . . . minorities live in these
situations, it should not be surprising that their undercount rates are higher.”).
79. The three phases are the “Postal Vacancy Check,” “Nonresponse Follow-Up,” and
“Integrated Coverage Measurement.” See id. at 26, 29.
80. See Holmes, supra note 9, at A1 (stating that data from 90% of the homes in the country
will be used to determine the number and characteristics of the remaining 10% of the
population).
81. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 26.
82. The Census Bureau estimates that the Postal Service will identify about 5% of
households as vacant in 2000. See id.
83. See id.
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designated as vacant.84 This method was used in the 1970 census and
is less controversial than the other two planned uses of sampling.85
The Administration also plans to use statistical sampling to
determine the characteristics of the portion of the population that
fails to return the mailed questionnaires.86 In conducting the 2000
census, the Administration plans to rely mainly on mail returns of
census questionnaires, as it has in every census since 1970.87 Many
households, however, do not return the mailed questionnaire: in
1970, when the mailed questionnaire was first utilized, the mail
response rate was 78%, it declined to 65% in 1990, and is projected
to remain the same in 2000.88
The Bureau will attempt to contact the households that do not
respond to the mailed questionnaire in the “Nonresponse Follow-Up”
phase of the census.89 The Bureau has divided the country into
roughly 60,000 census tracts, which are neighborhoods with roughly
1,700 housing units and 4,000 people.90 Census officials plan to
contact 90% of households directly in each census tract.91 To obtain
information from 90% of housing units in each census tract, those
tracts with lower mail response rates will have a higher share of
housing units visited by census officials in the follow-up stage.92 For
example, for census tracts in which 80% of addresses return their
forms by mail, the enumerators will be assigned randomly-selected
addresses that represent half of the addresses that did not respond.93
While, if only 70% of addresses return their forms, enumerators will
be assigned to two out of every three addresses not responding.94

84. See id.
85. The uncontroversial nature of sampling in the “Postal Vacancy Check” phase of the
census is demonstrated by its absence from the legal challenge in either of the two lawsuits that
are the subject of this Comment. See United States House of Representatives v. United States
Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 76, 80-81 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that only sampling in
the “Nonresponse Follow Up” and “Integrated Coverage Measurement” phases was being
challenged); Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same).
86. The Census Bureau calls this phase of the census “Nonresponse Follow-Up.” See
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 26-27.
87. See id.
88. See id. (documenting the declining mail response rate).
89. The projected mail response rate in 2000 of approximately 65% will leave nearly 34
million occupied households that did not respond. See id. at 26.
90. See id. at 27.
91. The 90% figure is a combination of the percentage of homes that returned mailed
questionnaires and those actually visited by enumerators in the follow-up stage. See id.
92. The group of houses that the enumerators visit is known as the “sample.” See id.
93. The Census Bureau’s goal for total direct contacts in each census tract is 90% of
households. Thus, if 80% of households returned their questionnaires and half of the nonresponding 20% of homes were visited in the follow-up stage, the 90% goal would be reached.
See id. at 28.
94. The goal is 90% total direct contacts. See id.
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After enumerators visit the sample housing units, the characteristics
of those units will be used to estimate the characteristics of the
housing units not in the “Nonresponse Follow-Up” sample.95
In the third use of statistical sampling in the 2000 census, the
“Integrated Coverage Measurement” phase (“ICM”), the Census
Bureau plans to interview a random sample of 750,000 households to
determine what proportion of the people living in the sample blocks
were included and what proportion were excluded in the initial
phases of the census.96 The information from this sample will then be
used to adjust the census figures for the population as a whole.97
To select the sample 750,000 households, the Census Bureau plans
to classify each of the country’s seven million blocks into groups
known as strata.98 These strata will be based on the characteristics of
each block in the 1990 census, such as the block’s state, racial and
ethnic composition, and proportion of homeowners to renters.99
Enumerators will then conduct interviews at the 750,000 housing
units in the sample blocks.100 Housing units in which the census data
compiled before the ICM interview is different from that received in
the ICM interview will be assigned to a follow-up interview.101
Comparing the results of the ICM with the results of the initial phase
will reveal whom, if anybody, was missed in the sample blocks.102
Finally, the relative accuracy of the ICM responses and the initial
phases of the census in determining the true population of the
sample households will be determined and then used to adjust the
population for the country as a whole.103

95. For example, in a census tract with 1,000 housing units and mail responses from 800
housing units, information on the remaining housing units would be based on a one in two
sample of 100 housing units. See id.
96. This phase seeks to count persons missed in household units that did supply some
information in the earlier phases of the census. See id. at 29.
97. The Census Bureau will use a statistical method known as Dual System Estimation to
estimate the extent to which housing units and people were correctly included in the initial
data collection phase, missed, or counted in error for each state. See id. at 31.
98. See id. at 30.
99. The Census Bureau will then select blocks at random for each stratum, for a total of
25,000 blocks. See id. With blocks having an average of 30 housing units, the ICM will obtain
information from 750,000 housing units. See id.
100. These interviews will help establish an independent roster of Census Day residents in
the sample blocks that will be compared with census information from the initial phases. See id.
101. The follow-up interviewer seeks to determine the “true” number of inhabitants at the
address. See id.
102. Thus, the follow-up interview leads to a determination of whether the ICM response or
the initial phase of the census is correct for a particular housing unit. See id. at 31.
103. This is done using Dual System Estimation. See id. at 32.
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II. THE COURT CHALLENGES TO THE ADMINISTRATION’S PLAN TO USE
STATISTICAL SAMPLING IN THE CENSUS
The Census Bureau’s plan to employ statistical sampling methods
in conducting the 2000 census was the subject of two court
challenges.104
In both cases, lower courts held that the
Administration’s planned use of statistical sampling violates the
Census Act.105 The Supreme Court upheld the lower court rulings on
January 25, 1999, in Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, by affirming one of the decisions and dismissing the
other.106
A. United States House of Representatives v. United States
Department of Commerce
On August 24, 1998, a special three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia,107 held that the
Census Bureau’s plan to use statistical sampling to supplement the
2000 census violates the Census Act.108 In United States House of
Representatives v. United States Department of Commerce, the House of
Representatives sued the Commerce Department—which oversees
the Census Bureau109—seeking to enjoin the Census Bureau from
using statistical sampling in the 2000 census.110 The House alleged
that the use of statistical sampling to supplement the census violates
both the Census Act,111 and the provision of the Constitution that calls
104. See United States House of Representatives v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing a challenge by the House of Representatives)
dismissed by, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999); Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543, 543 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(discussing a challenge by individual citizens of six states), aff’d sub nom. Department of
Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999).
105. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (holding that the use of statistical
sampling to determine the population for purposes of the apportionment of representatives in
Congress among the states violates the Census Act); Glavin, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (same).
106. See Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 779 (affirming the lower court decision in
Glavin and dismissing House of Representatives because the Supreme Court’s decision resolves the
substantive issues of both cases).
107. The law establishing a private right of action for persons aggrieved by the use of
statistical sampling in conducting the census provides that such suits shall be heard by a district
court of three judges. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 209(e)(1), 11 Stat. 2440,
2482 (1997) (“An action brought under this section shall be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges in accordance with section 2284 of title 28, United States Code.”); 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1994) (stating that a three-judge district court panel shall be convened when
required by an act of Congress). Appeals from the decisions of these three-judge courts are
taken directly to the Supreme Court. See id. § 1253 (1994).
108. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
109. See 13 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (noting that the Census Bureau is an agency within and under
the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department).
110. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
111. See 13 U.S.C. §§ 5-6 (1994) (outlining, in very broad terms, the manner in which the
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for an “actual enumeration”112 of the population every ten years.
Because the court was able to resolve the dispute on statutory
grounds, it did not address the constitutional question.113
The Census Act both empowers the Census Bureau to conduct the
decennial census and provides some guidelines for the manner in
which the census is to be conducted.114 Accordingly, the court’s
inquiry focused on the two provisions of the Census Act that address
the use of statistical sampling.115 First, the court examined 13 U.S.C.
§ 195 which states “[e]xcept for the determination of population for
purposes of apportionment” of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of Commerce “shall” order the use of statistical sampling if
he considers it feasible.116 Second, the court addressed 13 U.S.C.
§ 141(a) of the Act,117 which authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to
conduct the census every ten years “in such form and content as he
may determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special
surveys.”118 After examining the “plain meaning” and “legislative
history”119 of the two provisions, the court held that § 195 amounted
census is to be conducted).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (calling for an “actual enumeration” of the population
every ten years for the purpose of apportioning both tax liability and seats in Congress).
113. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (noting that federal courts are directed
to avoid deciding matters on constitutional grounds when the matter can be resolved on other
grounds).
114. See 13 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (assigning responsibility for the census to the Secretary of
Commerce).
115. See id. § 195 (mandating the use of statistical sampling in all areas deemed appropriate
by the Secretary, “[e]xcept for the determination of population for purposes of
apportionment”); id. § 141(a) (authorizing the Secretary to conduct the census in the manner
he deems appropriate, including the use of sampling).
116. See id. § 195.
117. Id. § 141(a).
118. Id.
119. Prior to 1957, Congress’s grant of authority over the census to the Secretary of
Commerce contained no specific mandates as to how the census was to be conducted. See
United States House of Representatives v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76,
98 (D.D.C. 1998). In 1957, Congress enacted § 195 of the Census Act. See Pub. L. No. 85-207,
71 Stat. 481, 483-84 (1957). At the time of its enactment, § 195 provided that except for the
determination of population for apportionment purposes, the Secretary of Commerce “may”
use sampling where he deems it appropriate. See id. Congress made it clear at the time that
although this provision sought to authorize the use of sampling in all areas of census taking, it
did “not authorize the use of sampling procedures in connection with apportionment of
Representatives.” See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1043, at 1, 10 (1957).
Section 195 was amended slightly in 1976, replacing the word “may,” with “shall.” See 13
U.S.C. § 195 (1994). The Administration argued that this change in the wording of § 195
eliminated the prohibition against the use of sampling procedures in connection with
apportionment. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 101. In dealing with this
argument, the court first noted that “dramatic departures from past practices should not be
read into statutes without a definitive signal from Congress.” See id. at 100-01 (citing Harrison v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)). Here, the court found no such definitive signal
from Congress. See id. at 100. Accordingly, the court determined the meaning of § 195 from
the face of the statute. See id.
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to a prohibition on the use of sampling for the purpose of
apportioning the House.120
Further, the court held that the
prohibition of § 195 trumped the apparent authorization of the use
of sampling contained in § 141(a).121 Although both sections address
the sampling issue, the court found that § 195 addressed the issue
more directly and therefore, was the controlling provision.122 Hence,
the court held that the use of statistical sampling for the purposes of
apportioning the House of Representatives violate the Census Act.123
The court’s “plain meaning” analysis was two-pronged: it involved
both a bewildering grammatical discussion124 and a hornbook
principle of statutory construction.125 First, the court set out to
determine whether the “except/shall” sentence structure of § 195
amounted to a prohibition in the area covered by the exception.126
That is, does the statement, “[e]xcept for purposes of apportioning
the House of Representatives, the Secretary shall order the use of
sampling” prohibit the use of sampling for the purpose of
apportioning the House or does the statement simply not address the
legality of sampling in the apportionment context?127 Bringing this
grammatical conundrum to the attention of the court, the
Administration argued that an exception from a mandate is not a
prohibition in the area covered by the exception; instead, the area
covered by the exception is discretionary.128 After considerable
120. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
121. “[W]hile section 141 permits sampling techniques and surveys in the conduct of the
decennial census, that general grant is subject to the more specific ‘Use of Sampling’ directive
in section 195, which . . . explicitly proscribes the use of sampling for apportioning
representatives among the states.” Id. at 103.
122. See id. (holding that § 195’s prohibition on the use of sampling in determining the
population for the purpose of apportioning seats in the House was more on point than
§ 141(a)’s general grant of authority to use sampling).
123. See id. at 104.
124. See id. at 99 (discussing the various ways in which “except/shall” sentence structures,
like the one in § 195, may be read).
125. When construing a statute that has two seemingly conflicting provisions, the more
specific provision controls the general. See id. at 103.
126. See id. at 98.
127. See id. at 99.
128. In support of this reading of the “except/shall” sentence structure, the Administration
cited several examples from the United States Code in which an exception from a mandate that
a federal officer “shall” do something does not constitute a prohibition in the area covered by
the exception. See id.
One such example involves a statutory mandate to the Secretary of Interior: “[E]xcept in
emergencies, any regulations of the Secretary promulgated under this section shall be put into
effect only after consultation with the appropriate fish and game agency.” See 16 U.S.C.
§ 230(d) (1994). The defendants note that this provision does not forbid the Secretary of the
Interior from consulting with fish and game agencies in an emergency if he so chooses. See
House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 99. Thus, they argue that the “except/shall” sentence
structure in § 195 should not be read as a prohibition against sampling for apportioning
representatives among the states. See id.
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explanation, the court disagreed with the Administration’s
interpretation of § 195.129 In so holding, the court reasoned that the
parties’ relation to the subject matter of the exception was crucial.130
Here, the apportionment of seats in the House is of the utmost
importance to the party making the statement—Congress.131
Therefore, the court refused to believe that Congress’s intent in
excepting the apportionment of the House from an authorization to
use sampling was to leave that all-important matter to the discretion
of the Secretary of Commerce.132
The importance of this
interpretation of § 195 was cemented by the court’s adherence to the
canon of statutory construction that provides that when two
provisions of a statute conflict with each other, the more specific of
the two provisions is controlling.133 Relying on the section headings
of the two provisions, § 141 is entitled “Population and Census
Information” and § 195 is entitled “Use of Sampling,” the court
concluded that § 195 more specifically addressed the sampling issue,
and therefore, was controlling.134
For the court, the statutory construction issue was relatively
simple.135 Although § 141(a) represents a congressional endorsement
of the use of sampling methods in some aspects of the Census
Bureau’s work, § 195 specifically forbids the use of sampling for the
purpose of apportioning seats in Congress.136 Thus, the court granted
129. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (explaining that although the
Administration’s reading of the “except/shall” sentence structure is proper in some instances, it
is “strained” and “incorrect” when applied to § 195).
130. Refusing to adhere to any strict rule on the reading of “except/shall” sentences, the
court instead relied on “common sense” and background knowledge concerning the subject
matter of the exception. See id. To illustrate its point about background knowledge, the court
considered the statement “except for my grandmother’s wedding dress, you shall take the
contents of my closet to the cleaners.” Id. The court then reasoned that the party issuing the
directive to take the items to the cleaners would be very upset if she learned that the wedding
dress had been taken to the cleaners. See id. The reason for this result is because of the court’s
background knowledge that “[wedding dresses] are extraordinarily fragile and of deep
sentimental value to family members. We therefore would not expect that the decision to take
the dress to the cleaners would be purely discretionary.” Id.
131. See id. (noting that the apportionment function is the only constitutional purpose of
the census).
132. See id. (reasoning that it is clear that the congressional apportionment function merits
particularized treatment because each time Congress has authorized the use of sampling, it has
excepted the apportionment function).
133. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. “A general statutory rule usually does not
govern unless there is no more specific rule.” Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,
524 (1989).
134. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (stating that of the two provisions,
§ 195 is “clearly the more specific, and therefore controlling” provision).
135. See id. (utilizing statutory construction to reach a resolution).
136. See id. (holding that § 141(a)’s general authorization to use statistical sampling is
circumscribed by § 195’s explicit proscription of the use of sampling for apportioning House
seats among the states).
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summary judgment in favor of the House and enjoined the Census
Bureau from using statistical sampling for the purpose of
apportioning seats in the House of Representatives.137
B. Glavin v. Clinton
On September 24, 1998, in Glavin v. Clinton, a special three-judge
panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia138 resolved the statistical sampling issue in the same manner
as the United States House of Representatives v. United States Department of
Commerce court.139 The Glavin court held that the use of statistical
sampling for the purpose of apportioning seats in the House violates
the Census Act.140 Glavin was more than simply a reiteration of the
House of Representatives holding, however.141 The precariousness of the
House’s standing to bring suit had the potential to make the House of
Representatives holding little more than a temporary resolution to the
census battle.142 Perhaps because of doubts as to whether the House
137. See id. at 79.
138. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining why challenges to the Census
Bureau’s planned use of sampling are heard by three-judge district courts, with appeals taken
directly to the Supreme Court).
139. See Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543, 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that the Census
Act prohibits the use of statistical sampling for purposes of apportionment).
140. See id.
141. As the first of the two census cases, and the one that involved a head-to-head power
struggle between the Republican-controlled House and the Administration, United States House
of Representatives v. United States Department of Commerce was the more high-profile of the two
census cases. See Holmes, supra note 9, at A1 (reporting the House of Representatives decision on
the front page of The New York Times).
The Glavin holding, however, has proven to be the more significant of the two because of the
precariousness of the House of Representatives’ legal standing to bring suit. See Joan Biskupic,
High Court Arguments in Census Cases Leave Little to Count On, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1998, at A2
(quoting Justice Scalia saying, “I don’t see how you resolve these inter-branch disputes by
dragging in a third branch”). To have standing to sue, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that she
has suffered an injury. As Justice Scalia observed, “[t]here is no case or controversy . . . when
there are no adverse parties with personal interest in the matter.” Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 880, 881 (1983).
142. The House’s claim to injury certainly was strained. The injury in House of Representatives
consisted of the House of Representatives’ inability to receive population information based on
a headcount of the kind required by statute. See 11 F. Supp. 2d at 85. For the House of
Representatives court, “informational injury” was sufficient. See id. Indeed, the House of
Representatives court explained that “[t]he inability to receive information which a person is
entitled to by law is sufficiently concrete and particular to satisfy constitutional standing
requirements.” Id. (citing Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784 (1998)).
The decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, is perhaps the Court’s most liberal
interpretation of the injury requirement. See 118 S. Ct. 1777 (1998). The Court held that a
group of voters had suffered injury sufficient to confer standing where they were deprived of
information regarding political contributions that was statutorily required to be publicly
disclosed. See id. at 1784. A group of voters attempted to challenge a decision of the Federal
Election Commission (“FEC”) not to treat the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(“AIPAC”) as a “political committee” under the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). See
id. at 1781-82. The FEC’s decision was significant because FECA imposes record-keeping and
disclosure requirements upon groups that fall within the Act’s definition of a “political
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had standing to challenge the Census Bureau’s plan, the Supreme
Court ruled on the legality of the use of statistical sampling for the
purpose of apportioning seats in the House on the facts of Glavin and
decided to dismiss House of Representatives.143 Thus, Glavin is an
extremely important case because it guaranteed a Supreme Court
ruling on the legality of the use of sampling in the 2000 census.144
While the Glavin court reached the same holding on the statistical
sampling issue as the House of Representatives court, it expressed even
more certainty in doing so.145 Indeed, the Glavin court resolved the
sampling issue in little more than two pages.146 The Glavin court
relied solely on the text of the Census Act in reaching its holding that
the Census Act prohibits the use of statistical sampling to determine
the population for the purpose of apportioning seats in the House.147
Unlike the House of Representatives court, and many observers of the
battle over the census, the Glavin court did not view the Census Act as
either ambiguous or vague on the issue of sampling.148 With the aid
committee.” See id. at 1781. As a result of the FEC’s decision, AIPAC did not have to publicly
disclose information, including information regarding the group’s contributions to political
candidates, that it would have been required to make public had the FEC designated it a
“political committee.” See id. at 1782-83.
Based on the assumption that the FEC’s decision violated FECA, the Court found that the
voters’ inability to obtain information that AIPAC should have been required to make public
under FECA was an injury sufficient to confer standing. See id. at 1784. The injury was
“concrete” and “particular,” the Court held, because the information that the voters had been
deprived of would have helped them evaluate candidates for public office. See id. Thus, the
concrete and particular “informational injury” in Akins had three elements: first, a statutory
requirement that information be publicly disclosed; second, one’s inability to obtain such
information; and third, some need to obtain the information on the part of the party bringing
suit. See id. at 1784-87.
In House of Representatives, two of the three elements arguably were not present. Although the
House has a statutory right to receive population information, the House would not be
deprived of that information, nor did the House demonstrate any need for the population
information of the type required by the Census Act, as opposed to population information
tabulated through the use of statistical sampling. See House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at
85-87. In the census dispute, of course, the House did not allege that it was in danger of
receiving no population information at all from the Census Bureau, but rather that sampling
would cause the House to receive the “wrong” information because the census would be
conducted unlawfully. See id. at 85-86.
143. See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765,
779 (1999) (dismissing United States House of Representatives v. United States Department of Commerce
case because the suit no longer presented a federal question after the Court’s decision on the
facts of Glavin v. Clinton).
144. See High Court Widens Review of Census Sampling, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1998, at A5
(noting that the Court would possibly not have been able to issue a ruling on the merits of the
census dispute had it not decided to hear Glavin because the House’s disputed standing “is a
potential stumbling block to deciding the case on its merits”).
145. See Glavin, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (calling the statute “unambiguous,” as well as
“coherent and consistent”).
146. See id. at 550-53.
147. See id. at 553 (stating that a conclusive reading of the statute’s text on its face ends the
court’s task).
148. “In sum, the only plausible interpretation of the plain language and structure of the
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of a few basic principles of statutory construction the Glavin court
reconciled seemingly contradictory provisions within the Act.
Primarily, the court relied on the rule of statutory construction that
implores courts to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of
a statute, “rather than to emasculate an entire section.”149 Applying
this rule to the sampling issue, the court sought to interpret the
Census Act in a way that gave meaning both to § 141(a) and § 195.150
The Glavin court reasoned that if it were to accept the
Administration’s argument and hold that § 195 did not prohibit the
use of statistical sampling in connection with apportioning seats in
the House, the “[e]xcept for” clause of § 195 would be rendered
meaningless.151 That is, under such a reading, the Administration’s
authority to use sampling would be “precisely the same with the
‘except for’ language as it would be if the statute did not contain that
language.”152 The Glavin court simply refused to believe that
Congress would have included the “[e]xcept for” language if it did
not intend to prohibit the use of sampling in determining the
population for purposes of apportionment.153
After rejecting the Administration’s reading of the interplay of the
two provisions, the Glavin court held that the provisions were not
actually in conflict.154 Indeed, the court found that the “only
plausible interpretation” of the two sections is “that section 195
prohibits sampling for apportionment and section 141(a) allows it for
all other purposes.”155 With this confident interpretation, the court
ended its inquiry.156
Act is that § 195 prohibits sampling for apportionment and § 141 allows it for all other
purposes.” Id.
149. See id. at 551 (stating that “the cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and
not to destroy” all provisions of the statute being interpreted) (citing United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955)).
150. Indeed, the court was able to ascribe a distinct meaning to each section. See id. at 55051 (explaining that § 141(a) “generally authorizes the Secretary to use sampling in conducting
various aspects of the census,” while § 195 clearly prohibits the use of sampling for determining
the apportionment of House seats).
151. The court reasoned further that were it to find that § 141(a)’s authorization to use
sampling trumped the apparent prohibition contained in § 195, the entire latter provision
would be useless. See id. at 552. Because § 141(a) already contains a general authorization to
use sampling where appropriate, reading § 195 as another unconditional grant of authority
would render § 195 superfluous. See id.
152. See id.
153. “As Congress prohibited sampling for purposes of apportionment, the Secretary has no
authority to do anything but an actual headcount of the population for this purpose.” Id. at
553.
154. See id. at 552.
155. Id.
156. See id. (stating that “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, the first canon of
statutory construction is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete’”) (quoting Connecticut
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
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C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Department of Commerce v. United
States House of Representatives
On January 25, 1999, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,157
affirmed the lower court’s decision in Glavin, and dismissed the suit
brought by the House of Representatives.158 The Court’s decision in
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives was based
on the plain text of the Census Act and a finding that the legislative
history of the Census Act conclusively evinces a congressional intent
to prohibit the use of statistical sampling for the purpose of
apportioning House seats among the states.159 Justice O’Connor’s
majority opinion gleaned Congress’s intent to prohibit sampling in
connection with apportionment from a brief review of the history of
the census, and a more probing examination of the effect of
amendments made to the Census Act in 1976.160
1. The Court’s review of the history of the census
In determining the legality of the Administration’s plan to use
statistical sampling in the 2000 census, the Supreme Court—like the
two lower courts before it—was forced to reconcile two seemingly
contradictory provisions in the Census Act.161 Before resolving the
apparent contradiction between § 141(a) and § 195, the Court set out
to put the Census Act in its proper historical context.162
The Court began its brief study of the history of census law by
noting that from America’s first census in 1790 through the 1950
census—fifteen censuses in all—Congress prohibited the use of
statistical sampling in calculating the population for purposes of
apportionment.163 The Court observed that Congress’s directive to
157. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas composed the majority, while Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and
Justice Breyer dissented.
See Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765, 766 (1999).
158. See id. at 779 (affirming the judgment of the Eastern District of Virginia in Clinton v.
Glavin, and dismissing the suit in United States House of Representatives v. United States Department of
Commerce because the Court’s decision resolved the federal question in House of Representatives).
159. See id. at 775 (agreeing with the district court below that the plain text and legislative
history demonstrate that the use of statistical sampling for the purpose of congressional
apportionment violates the Census Act).
160. Justice O’Connor noted that “[a]n understanding of the historical background of the
decennial census and the Act that governs it is essential to a proper interpretation of the Act’s
present text.” Id.
161. See id. at 776-79 (interpreting the meaning of the apparently contradictory provisions of
§ 141(a) and § 195 of the Census Act).
162. See id. at 775 (explaining that to properly interpret the present text of the Census Act,
one must understand the history of the decennial census).
163. In a footnote, the Court listed eleven statutes that governed census taking throughout
the first 150 years or so of American history. See id. at 775 n.5. An example of the prohibition
on sampling techniques included in these laws is the Act of Mar. 23, 1830, § 1, 4 Stat. 384, which
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census-takers changed relatively little throughout this period.164 For
example, the 1790 census legislation required census enumerators to
swear under oath to make “a just and perfect enumeration” of every
person within the division to which they were assigned.165 More than
a century and a half later, in 1960, the relevant law required
enumerators to “visit personally each dwelling house in his
subdivision” to obtain “every item of information” necessary to
conduct the census.166
For the Court, this consistent requirement that census figures be
based on a direct headcount tells much about Congress’s intent in
enacting § 141(a) and § 195 of the Census Act.167 Significantly, in
1957, while the 1954 Census Act provision requiring a direct
headcount was still on the books,168 Congress enacted § 195.169 That
section provided that “[e]xcept for the determination of population
for apportionment purposes, the Secretary may” authorize the use of
statistical sampling in conducting the census.170 Thus, Congress’s
historical demand that the apportionment census be calculated on
the basis of a direct headcount, combined with the language of § 195,
made it clear to the Court that § 195 authorized the Secretary of
Commerce to order sampling used in many areas of the census, “but
it did not authorize the use of sampling procedures in connection
with apportionment of Representatives.”171 After reaching this
conclusion, the Court addressed the effect of the 1976 amendments
to the Census Act.
2. The Court’s interpretation of the 1976 Amendments to the Census Act
In 1976, the provisions of the Census Act at issue in the dispute

provided, “the said enumeration shall be made by an actual inquiry by such marshals or
assistants, at every dwelling-house, or by personal inquiry of the head of every family.”
164. Indeed, the requirement that census enumerators visit each home in person did not
change at all until 1919 and even then the change was not great. See Act of Mar. 3, 1919, § 2, 40
Stat. 1296 (noting that enumerators would be permitted “to gather from neighbors information
regarding households where no one is present”).
165. See Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 775 n.5 (quoting Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat.
101).
166. See id. at 776 (quoting Act of Aug. 31, 1954, § 25(c), 68 Stat. 1012, 1015).
167. “[T]he Census Acts of 1810 through 1950 required census enumerators to visit each
home in person. This demonstrates a longstanding tradition of Congress’s forbidding the use
of estimation techniques in conducting the apportionment census.” Id. at 781 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
168. See Act of Aug. 31, 1954, § 25(c), 68 Stat. 1012, 1015 (requiring enumerators to “visit
personally each dwelling house in his subdivision” in order to obtain “every item of information
and all particulars required for any census or survey” conducted in connection with the census).
169. See Act of Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-207, § 14, 71 Stat. 481, 483-84.
170. See id.
171. See Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 776.

1999] WHAT TO DO WHEN THE GOVERNMENT CAN’T COUNT

1125

over the 2000 census took their present form.172 First, Congress
amended § 141(a) to authorize the Secretary to take the census of the
population every ten years “in such form and content as he may
determine, including the use of sampling and special surveys.”173
Second, Congress replaced the word “may” in § 195 with the word
“shall.”174 Accordingly, after the enactment of § 141(a) there are two
possible readings of the Census Act that would permit the use of
statistical sampling in connection with apportionment. A court could
either hold that § 141(a)’s authorization to use sampling trumped
the apparent restrictions on the use of sampling in § 195,175 or a court
could hold that § 195 mandated the use of sampling in all areas of
census-taking except the apportionment census.176
The Administration made both of these arguments and the Court
rejected both of them.177 The Court recognized the sweep of § 141(a)
standing on its own, describing it as “a broad statement that in
collecting a range of demographic information during the decennial
census, the Bureau would be permitted to use sampling procedures
and special surveys.”178 The Court’s reading of § 141(a)’s scope
narrowed considerably, however, when viewed in light of the rest of
the Census Act and Congress’s historical reliance on direct
headcount censuses.179 While § 141(a) was a “broad grant of
172. There was one change in the Census Act between 1957 and 1976 that is relevant to the
sampling dispute. In 1964, Congress repealed the provision requiring all census information to
be collected from personal visits by enumerators to households, and in so doing permitted the
Census Bureau to institute its “mailout-mailback” method of census data collection. See Act of
Aug. 31, 1964, 78 Stat. 737; Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 776 (noting that census officials
began conducting approximately 60% of the census through the “mailout-mailback” system
after this change).
173. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1994).
174. Before the 1976 amendment, § 195 read: “Except for the determination of population
for apportionment purposes, the Secretary may, where he deems it appropriate, authorize the use
of the statistical method known as ‘sampling’ in carrying out the provisions of this title.” Act of
Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-207, § 14, 71 Stat. 481, 483-84. (emphasis added). After the
amendment § 195 reads: “Except for the determination of population for purposes of
apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he
considers it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known as ‘sampling’ in carrying
out the provisions of this title.” 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994) (emphasis added).
175. See Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
§ 141(a) gives unqualified authority to the Secretary of Commerce to use sampling in the
decennial census).
176. See id. at 777 (noting that one could reasonably read § 195 as “permissive” with regard
to the use of sampling for apportionment purposes if looking to the text of the Census Act
alone).
177. See id. (holding that § 195 governs the issue of the use of sampling in the
apportionment context because it is more specific than § 141(a) and that § 195 prohibits the
use of sampling in calculating the population for purposes of apportionment).
178. Id. at 776.
179. See id. at 777 (describing the effect of § 195 on the apparent broad authorization to use
sampling in § 141(a)).
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authority,” § 195 was a specific, clear prohibition on the use of
sampling in the apportionment context.180 Thus, the Act does not
mandate or prohibit the use of sampling for apportionment
purposes.
The majority’s last step toward concluding that the use of statistical
sampling in connection with apportionment violated the Act was to
reject the Administration’s reading of the “except/shall” sentence
structure of § 195.181 The Court noted that when divorced from
historical context, “the language in the amended [section] 195 might
reasonably be read as either permissive or prohibitive with regard to
the use of sampling for apportionment purposes.”182 The historical
context, however, is central to understanding “except/shall” sentence
structures.183 And here, where “the context is provided by more than
200 years during which federal statutes have prohibited the use of
statistical sampling where apportionment is concerned,” the excepted
portion of § 195 must be read as a prohibition.184 Accordingly, the
Court affirmed the decision of the Eastern District of Virginia in
Glavin and upheld the injunction against the use of statistical
sampling in connection with apportionment.185
III. THE LIMITS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
V. UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECISION
The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the lower court’s decision in
Glavin v. Clinton was certainly a setback for the Administration and
sampling proponents.186 Because the decision only found sampling
illegal in the apportionment context,187 the setback is much more
limited than it might first appear.188 Population figures from the
180. Id. at 776.
181. See id. at 777 (noting that the Administration cited examples of statutes with the same
“except/shall” sentence structure in arguing that “the exception cannot reasonably be
construed as prohibiting the excepted activity”).
182. Id.
183. See id. (explaining that the interpretation of the “except/shall” structure in § 195
depends on the broader historical context).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 779.
186. See Linda Greenhouse, Jarring Democrats, Court Rules Census Must Be by Actual Count, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at A1 (stating that because of the decision, Democrats took a “bitter
blow”). The Administration believed that the use of statistical sampling was legal even in the
apportionment context and had hoped for a Supreme Court ruling to that effect. See Joan
Biskupic & Barbara Vobejda, High Court Rejects Sampling in Census, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at
A1 (noting that the Administration argued that statistical sampling could be used for
apportionment).
187. See James Dao, The Nation: Two (Many) Choices for 2000 Census, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999,
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (stressing that the Court did not prohibit all sampling and left open
its use for other purposes).
188. See Steven A. Holmes, White House Considers New Uses for Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
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decennial census are used for many purposes.189 Most importantly,
census data is used by federal and state governmental agencies to
allocate funds under many programs, and by the states to draw
federal and state legislative districts.190 Nothing in the Supreme
Court’s ruling prohibits the Census Bureau from using sampling to
supplement census data for these purposes.191
Before the Supreme Court decision, the seemingly important issue
surrounding the Administration’s plan for the 2000 census was the
effect of a sampling-adjusted census on the apportionment of seats in
the House. The focus now has shifted to funding and redistricting.192
The Court’s decision notwithstanding, an Administration decision to
use sampling in the census still has the potential to ameliorate greatly
the ill effects of the differential undercount.193 The use of sampling
in the census could make the distribution of funds under
government programs more equitable,194 as well as measurably alter
the partisan composition of congressional delegations and state
legislatures across the country.195 Accordingly, the funding and
redistricting issues are at least as important as the apportionment of
seats in the House.196
1998, at A12 (stating that a Supreme Court decision invalidating the use of sampling for
congressional apportionment would only add “a new wrinkle” to the census debate).
189. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 22-25 (explaining that census data
is used for congressional apportionment, state redistricting, and the distribution of funds under
federal and state population-based programs).
190. See id. at 23-25 (discussing how federal and state agencies use census data and detailing
how census data is used for redistricting).
191. See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765,
779 (1999) (holding that statistical sampling is prohibited only for apportionment purposes);
see also Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (stating that the Court left open the use
of sampling for other purposes).
192. See Biskupic & Vobejda, supra note 186, at A1 (stating that despite the Court’s decision,
the Administration will continue with its sampling plan for use in allocating funds under federal
government programs, as well as for use by the states in redistricting); see also David G. Savage &
Nick Anderson, Court Rejects Plan to Use Sampling for 2000 Census, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at
A10 (noting that the White House still intends to use sampling for other purposes including
distributing federal funds).
193. See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (maintaining that the proposed use
of sampling data for redistricting could alleviate the undercount in large cities).
194. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 35 (explaining that the differential
undercount results in certain groups “get[ting] less credit for their population than they are
due in terms of money received under population-based programs”).
195. See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (discussing how the use of samplingadjusting census figures in redistricting likely will add Democratic seats in Congress and state
legislatures).
196. Despite the controversy surrounding the use of sampling in connection with
apportioning seats in the House, one study has shown, using 1990 as an example, that the affect
of sampling on apportionment would not be great. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra
note 1, at 40 (arguing that sampling in 1990 would not have made a significant difference
because three states would have gained one seat, while three states would have lost one seat).
Specifically, the winners would have been Georgia (a 12th seat), Montana (a 2nd seat), and
California (a 53rd seat), while the losers with an adjusted census would have been Oklahoma,
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A. The Use of Sampling-Adjusted Data for the Allocation of Funds Under
Government Programs
The federal government disburses nearly $200 billion each year to
state and local governments using formulas involving census
population data.197 This money is distributed under 108 different
federal programs, the largest of which are Medicaid, Highway
Planning and Construction, Social Service Block Grants, and
Community Development Block Grants.198 Of these four programs,
three are aimed at helping inner-city populations.199 The differential
undercount limits the effectiveness of population-based programs
such as these because minorities, and the inner-city neighborhoods in
which minorities often live, are denied the amount of government
resources to which they are entitled.200 The states also use census data
to distribute funds.201 Although little data exists to document the
exact dollar figures involved, it is believed that the census affects the
distribution of funds in the states even more than at the federal
level.202
The fact that the equitable distribution of vast sums of money
under population-based programs is contingent on an accurate
census would seem to provide enough of an incentive for the
Administration to continue its efforts to use statistical sampling in the
2000 census.203 As the example of Hartford, Connecticut204 makes
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See id.
197. See Vobejda, supra note 55, at A6 (noting that statistical sampling could still be used to
distribute the over $200 billion in federal funds).
198. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 40-42 (noting that in 1990 the
federal government distributed $34 billion in Medicaid funds, $13.4 billion under the Highway
Planning and Construction program, $2.7 billion in Social Service Block Grants, and $2.2
billion in Community Development Block Grants).
199. Medicaid is the federal health insurance program for indigent and disabled persons.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u (1994). Social Service Block Grants provide funds to states and
municipalities in need of publicly funded social services. See id. § 1397. Community
Development Block Grants provide federal funds to poor, urban communities to stimulate
construction. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 322-24 (explaining the
purpose of community development block grants).
200. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 41-42 (“Because in the 1990 census
blacks and other minority groups had a larger undercount than whites—as in prior censuses—
minorities and the communities in which they live have been disadvantaged in federal and
other programs in which population is an important factor for fund allocation.”).
201. See id. at 43 (noting that much of the effect of the differential undercount and any
attempt to remedy the undercount is felt at both the state and sub-state level).
202. The effect of the census is greater at the state level because there simply are more state
programs than there are federal programs that use census figures to distribute funds. See id.
203. The Census Bureau initially decided to use sampling to supplement census figures
because statistics experts agreed that sampling was the best way to remedy the problem of
minorities being uncounted at higher rates than whites. See supra Part I.C (explaining the
Administration’s plan for the 2000 census and the Administration’s reasons for departing from
traditional census-taking methods).
Such a remedy would give these minority groups the representation in Congress and state
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clear, even after the Supreme Court’s ruling, much of what the
Administration set out to accomplish through the use of sampling
remains within its reach.205
B. The States’ Use of Sampling-Adjusted Data for Redistricting
The Administration’s use of statistical sampling takes on even
greater importance when one considers the potential impact of the
states’ use of adjusted data for redrawing federal and state legislative
districts.206 Although not constitutionally bound to do so,207 the states
use census data to draw congressional and state legislative districts.208
If the Administration uses statistical sampling to adjust the census,
each state will have a choice to make in deciding which data to use in
redrawing their legislative districts: the census figures compiled for
the purpose of apportioning seats in the House or the adjusted
census data.209 Which of these options a given state will choose will
legislatures that their numbers justify and it would give cities and states money under federal
and state population-based programs on the basis of their actual population. See supra Part I.C.
The Administration still can achieve these objectives despite the Supreme Court’s ruling
prohibiting sampling in the apportionment context. See Holmes, supra note 188, at A12
(reporting that the Administration is exploring ways to give Congress the unadjusted census
data and use the adjusted data for other purposes such as allocating federal funds).
204. Rather than being unique, the case of Hartford is indicative of the situation in inner
cities throughout the country. See David S. Broder, The Census Fight, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1999,
at B7 (discussing a simulated census that used sampling conducted in Sacramento, California
that added more than 6.3% to the city’s population, which would “translate into millions of
dollars of extra federal aid”).
205. See infra Part IV (explaining the potential impact of the use of statistical sampling in
the census despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives).
206. Although the House of Representatives determines the number of seats to which each
state is entitled, the state government determines the way those seats are divided within a state.
See Donald T. Deyo, To Adjust or Not To Adjust: That Is the Legal and Political Question, 13
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 114, 114-15 (1993) (noting that the political importance of whether to
use sampling rests on its potential use by state legislatures when redrawing congressional
districts, which must be done every 10 years to ensure that the districts have roughly equal
populations). Without the use of sampling, the states—because they use information provided
by the Census Bureau to redraw the districts—would have only the traditional headcount
figures, which are known to undercount minorities at a greater rate than whites, in redrawing
their districts. See id. at 117-19.
207. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966) (holding that although state
legislatures must be apportioned on the basis of population, they need not use the federal
census to do so); City of Detroit v. Franklin, 4 F.3d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir. 1993) (asserting that
the Constitution does not compel the states or Congress to use only unadjusted census figures
in redistricting).
208. See Holmes, supra note 188, at A12 (noting that states use population counts from the
census to redistrict).
209. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765, 779 (1999), the Census Bureau will not be able to conduct the
census without making public the traditional headcount figures and giving those figures to the
House for apportionment. Thus, if sampling is used to adjust the census there will be two sets
of census data, each with a cadre of politicians and experts attesting to the accuracy of the data.
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almost certainly depend upon the political affiliation of the state
government.210 States controlled by Democrats would most likely
choose the adjusted data, whereas states controlled by Republicans
would probably choose the census figures used to apportion the
House.211
The impact of a sampling-adjusted census on redrawing
congressional and state legislative districts would be the greatest in
states with large urban populations.212 States like California, Texas,
Illinois, New York, and Florida—the states that had the highest rates
of undercount in the 1990 census—would see their urban
populations significantly increase.213 This increase in the population
of America’s cities would shift political power within these states to
the urban areas.214 Inner-city communities would receive more
representatives in their state legislatures, as well as in Congress, if
those states choose to use the sampling-adjusted census figures in
conducting redistricting.215 One estimate suggests that if statistical
See Herbert A. Sample, Census Compromise May OK Two Sets of Data, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 20,
1998, at A12 (discussing the prospect of two sets of census figures: one set containing
unadjusted figures for congressional apportionment and the second set comprised of adjusted
figures to be used for the allocation of federal funds and state redistricting).
210. Gubernatorial and state legislative elections are always of heightened importance when
the victor will preside over redistricting. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Small Strides for Democrats
Could Be Big After Census, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B11 (noting that the party that controls
both chambers in a state legislature has an advantage in the redistricting process because
districts can be drawn legally in many different ways).
211. See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (stating that Democrats are arguing
for the use of sampling, while Republicans fight it); see also Ayres, supra note 210, at B11 (noting
that after the midterm elections this fall, Democrats are in control of both legislative chambers
in 21 states, while Republicans are in control of both chambers in 17 states).
The best example of what is at stake in redistricting following the 2000 census is in
California. California recently elected its first Democratic governor in 16 years, Gray Davis, and
he will be in office during redistricting. See Mark Z. Barabak, Davis, Boxer Win; Prop. 5 OK’d, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at A1 (reporting Gray Davis’ victory). California also has a Democraticallycontrolled legislature. See id. If the Administration uses sampling to adjust the census figures,
California—with Democrats in control of the statehouse and the Governor’s mansion—will use
the adjusted data. See id. (explaining that “[Democrats] will enjoy an upper hand in state
politics well into the early 21st century, thanks to unfettered control of the decennial
reapportionment process”). This will greatly affect the partisan composition of California’s 52member House delegation. See Leslie Wayne, Eye on 2000, National Parties Donate to State Races,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at A24 (quoting Craig Engle, general counsel of the National
Republican Senatorial Committee as stating that “[I]n California, there could be a difference of
10 House seats, depending upon how the map is drawn”).
212. See James Dao, Split Decision Sets Stage for State and Local Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999,
at A20 (explaining that in states with large cities, a decision to use census data adjusted with
statistical sampling would greatly affect the way legislative districts are drawn).
213. See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (noting that the population of large
cities would increase because the undercount in the last census was highest in large cities).
214. See id. (explaining that the use of sampling-adjusted census figures for redistricting
would result in urban areas receiving increased representation in both Congress and the state
legislatures at the expense of suburban areas).
215. See Barbara Vobejda, Ruling Tangles Scenarios for Census, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at
A5 (explaining how sampling-adjusted numbers would add “tens of thousands of people” to
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sampling were used to redraw congressional and state legislative
districts, 24 seats in the House of Representatives, 113 seats in state
senates, and 297 seats in state assemblies could switch from
Republican to Democratic control.216
The potential effect of the use of sampling-adjusted figures on the
political representation of America’s urban communities is difficult
to overstate.217 Experts claim that in New York City the use of
sampling-adjusted census figures in redrawing legislative districts
could lead to two new Democratic state Assembly seats and one
Democratic state Senate seat.218 In addition, it may shift two
Republican state Senate seats to the Democrats and reduce the
possibility of New York City losing a congressional seat to the
suburbs.219 In California, the use of sampling-adjusted figures for
redistricting would likely result in the shift of one or more seats in the
state legislature to Democratic-leaning Hispanic neighborhoods in
Los Angeles and possibly San Diego,220 and may result in the shift of
five to six House seats from Republicans to Democrats.221
Additionally, in states where Republicans hold narrow majorities in
state legislative bodies—for example, the Texas Senate and the
Houses in the Pennsylvania and Illinois legislatures—the use of
sampling-adjusted figures could help Democrats recapture
majorities.222
The opposing sides in the census debate view this potential
increase in the political power of America’s inner-cities quite
differently.223 For Democrats, the increase in political representation
urban areas); see also Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (contending that sampling
would shift seats to areas undercounted in 1990, such as Hispanic neighborhoods in Los
Angeles).
216. See Steven A. Holmes, The Path to the Next Census Has Been Far from Routine, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1999, at A18 (explaining the results of a study by Clark Bensen, demographer and
former Republican National Committee staffer). These projections are based on the
assumption that greater representation of urban areas in Congress and state legislatures would
redound to the benefit of Democrats. See id.
217. In the words of Republican National Committee Chairman, Jim Nicholson, in a 1997
memo: “An adjusted census could provide Democrats the crucial edge needed to prevail in
close contests to control several state legislative chambers.” Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in
Review), at 4.
218. See id. (discussing the potential effect from using a sampling-adjusted census on the
political representation of America’s big cities).
219. See id. (noting that regardless of whether sampling is used in the census, New York state
is expected to lose two seats in Congress in 2000).
220. See id. (assessing the effects of a sampling-adjusted census on redistricting in Los
Angeles).
221. See Vobejda, supra note 215, at A5 (reporting a study by Clark Bensen, head of Polidata,
a firm that conducts redistricting research).
222. See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (explaining how sampling may help
Democrats regain control of state legislatures).
223. For example, Representative Carolyn B. Maloney (D-N.Y.), the ranking Democrat on
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would represent an opportunity to win back the House and make
other gains at the ballot box without broadening their political
appeal.224 For Republicans, meanwhile, this shift would represent a
politically-motivated
gerrymandering
of
legislative
districts
throughout the nation.225 In reality, however, this shift would
represent an overdue recognition of the true population of urban
America.226
C. The Legality of Adjusting Census Data for Purposes Other Than
Apportionment of the House
An examination of both the Census Act and the court decisions at
issue in this Comment demonstrates that the use of statistical
sampling to supplement census data for any purpose other than
apportioning seats in the House is legal.227 In fact, Justice O’Connor’s
majority opinion in Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives notes that the Census Act requires the use of sampling
in the census for purposes other than apportionment where it is
feasible.228 Additionally, the only provisions of the Census Act that
address the issue of sampling outside of the apportionment context
authorize the use of sampling.229 Indeed, § 141(a) states that the
Secretary of Commerce “shall” order the use of sampling procedures
in all areas where it is feasible.230 Thus, the Administration is not
barred legally from using statistical sampling to supplement census
figures for purposes other than apportioning seats in the House.231
the Census Subcommittee in the House, has described Democrats’ role in the census debate
this way: “We’re not going to let the majority (in Congress) prevent those people from being
counted.”
Vobejda, supra note 215, at A5.
Republicans, meanwhile, refer to the
Administration’s census plans pejoratively as a “poll,” rather than as an “actual count,” and vow
to fight against funding it. See James Dao, Census Ruling Reignites a Partisan Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 1999, at A17 (quoting John Feehery, spokesman for House Speaker Dennis Hastert (RIll.)).
224. See Savage & Anderson, supra note 192, at A1 (explaining that Democrats believe that
the use of statistical sampling in the census “will increase political power in predominantly
Democratic areas”).
225. Indeed, upon first mention of a plan to use sampling despite the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, House Speaker Dennis
Hastert (R-Ill.) said that the Administration “should abandon its illegal and risky polling
scheme and start preparing for a true headcount.” See id.
226. See supra Part I.B (explaining the differential undercount problem).
227. See supra Parts II.A-C (explaining the courts’ holdings that the Census Act prohibits the
use of sampling in connection with apportionment).
228. See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765, 777
(1999) (stating that the 1976 amendments to the Census Act require the use of sampling for
other purposes, such as assembling demographic data, where feasible, but noting the continued
prohibition on use of sampling for apportionment purposes).
229. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(a), (d) (1994).
230. See id. § 141(a).
231. Although the use of sampling is not illegal for purposes other than apportionment, for
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court’s ruling may not have resolved the battle over
the 2000 census, but it has clarified several important issues in the
census debate. First, the Court guaranteed that the Census Bureau
will conduct a traditional headcount census with its ruling that such a
count is required for apportionment purposes.232 Second, and no less
important, the Court held that the use of sampling is legal, and
indeed may be required, in connection with census functions other
than apportionment.233 Lastly, the Court has cleared the way for the
political branches of government to resolve the many important
issues that still remain regarding the 2000 census.234
A. The Administration
In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Administration must
prepare to conduct a census that employs sampling in calculating the
population for distributing funds under government programs, but
not for apportioning seats in the House.235 The Administration’s
efforts to conduct a census using statistical sampling demonstrates
that the Administration recognizes the seriousness of the differential
undercount problem.236 The persistent differential undercount
the Census Bureau to use sampling in the 2000 census for any purpose Congress will need to
appropriate the funds necessary to conduct a two-number census. The Republican-controlled
House is, of course, averse to doing so. See Holmes, supra note 188, at A18 (noting Republicans’
commitment to conduct a traditional census count). Likewise, any attempt by Congress to pass
a law prohibiting sampling in any context would be vetoed by the President, and Republicans—
with a five-seat majority in each chamber—lack the votes needed to override such a veto. See
Holmes, supra note 216, at A18 (noting the President’s expressed commitment to veto any
census bill that forbids the use of sampling). Thus, the fate of sampling in the 2000 census will
be decided in the give and take of budget negotiations over the next two years. See Steven A.
Holmes, White House Considers New Uses for Census Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at A12
(noting that the legal battles will take a backseat to a political power struggle over the
appropriation of funds for the census).
232. See supra Part II.C (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce
v. United States House of Representatives).
233. See Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 778 (noting that the 1976 amendments to § 195
of the Census Act changed a provision that permitted the use of sampling for purposes other
than apportionment into one that “required” that sampling be used for such purposes if
feasible).
234. See Editorial, A Limited Census Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at A18 (describing the
Supreme Court’s decision as limited because the decision whether to use sampling in the
census will be made by the President and the Congress).
235. See supra Part II.C (explaining that the Supreme Court’s ruling prohibits sampling in
connection with apportionment, but allows its use for other purposes).
236. Since the Court’s ruling, the Administration has evinced renewed determination to use
sampling in the census in every legal manner. See Barbara Vobejda, Census Plans to Release Two
Sets of Numbers; Full Count, “Sampling” Results Both Proposed, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1999, at A2
(explaining that the Administration remains committed to using sampling in the census).
Indeed, just hours after the ruling, the Census Bureau announced its plans to conduct a census
with two sets of numbers, one set for apportionment and the other for the distribution of

1134

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1101

systematically deprives racial and ethnic minorities of the political
representation and government largesse that their numbers
demand.237 The Administration must devote the political capital
necessary to rectify this inequity.238
The Supreme Court’s holding that statistical sampling is illegal in
connection with apportionment certainly has hurt the cause of those
who seek to bring an end to the differential undercount problem.239
The harshness of the ruling can be lessened to a great degree,
however, by a determined effort on the part of the Administration to
conduct a census that produces two population figures.240 The first
number will be the total population in each state as tabulated by
traditional headcount methods and will be furnished to the House of
Representatives for the purpose of apportionment.241 The second set
of data will be compiled as prescribed in the Census Bureau plan for
the 2000 census and will be used by executive branch agencies to
distribute money under federal programs according to population.242
States will then have the option to choose the sampling-adjusted data
in drawing congressional and state legislative districts and thereby
further ameliorate the negative effects of the differential
undercount.243
federal funds and redistricting. See id.
237. See supra Parts III.A, III.B (explaining the effects of the differential undercount on the
political representation and the distribution of federal funds to undercounted areas).
238. Thus far, the Administration has demonstrated a high level of commitment to
remedying the negative effects of the differential undercount through the use of sampling in
the census. For example, on October 15, 1998, President Clinton sent a letter to House
Minority Leader, Richard A. Gephardt, stating “I am committed to vetoing any legislation from
the 106th Congress that restricts the ability of the Census Bureau to conduct its plans using
modern statistical methods.” See Holmes, supra note 231, at A18.
239. The decision hurt the cause of sampling proponents in two ways. First, the differential
undercount does affect congressional apportionment to some extent. A few states with large
uncounted populations unjustly are denied a seat in the House of Representatives every time
the House is apportioned on the basis of traditional headcount data. See MODERNIZING THE
U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 40 (noting that the use of sampling-adjusted census figures in the
apportionment following the 1990 census would have affected three House seats). Second, and
more importantly, the decision mandating a headcount census makes the Administration’s
efforts to use sampling much more expensive and therefore, much less politically popular. See
Barbara Vobejda, Hill Republicans Vow Fight on Dual Census, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1999, at A2
(noting that the Census Bureau projects that a census with two sets of numbers will cost
between $6 billion and $7 billion, while the initial Clinton plan was to cost approximately $4
billion).
240. See Vobejda, supra note 236, at A2 (describing the Administration’s plan to conduct a
census with two sets of numbers in the wake of the Supreme Court decision prohibiting
sampling in connection with apportionment).
241. See id. (stating that “the administration plans to produce one set of numbers for
apportionment and another for redistricting and federal funding”).
242. See id.
243. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (explaining that states are not
constitutionally required to use the Census Bureau’s population data in redistricting, but
traditionally have done so).
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To conduct a census with two sets of data—one set for
apportioning the House, one set for other purposes—the
Administration will need to demonstrate a great commitment to
ending the cycle of censuses that disproportionately fail to count
racial and ethnic minorities.244 Funding for the 2000 census will be
determined in the 2000 budget battle.245 The Administration will not
receive funding for a census that uses statistical sampling for any
purpose without making this issue a high priority in the budget
battle.246 For the Administration to succeed in this battle with
Congress, it must make the debate over the census a public one.247 If
President Clinton personally takes the lead in the fight to end the
cycle of censuses that disproportionately fail to count minorities,
Congress will appropriate the funds necessary to conduct a census
with two sets of data.
B. The States
If the Administration prevails in the battle over funding for the
2000 census, the next set of important decisions in the sampling
dispute will be made in the statehouses and governor’s mansions
across the country.248 In the wake of a federal resolution of the census
dispute, the states will have to make politically sensitive decisions of
extreme importance.249 Each state will have to determine which of
the two sets of census data to use in redrawing congressional and

244. Using sampling in the census will require a determined effort on the part of the
Administration because Republicans in control of Congress are, at this point, strongly opposed
to any census plan that involves the use of sampling. See Vobejda, supra note 239, at A2
(quoting Representative Dan Miller (R-Fla.), Chairman of the Census Subcommittee in the
House, calling the Administration’s plan to use statistical sampling an “irresponsible approach”
hidden “under a thinly veiled shield of so-called accuracy”).
245. See Steven A. Holmes, Census Ruling is Said to Cost $1.7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1999,
at A20 (reporting that the Census Bureau requested an additional $1.7 billion to conduct a twonumber census).
246. As long as the census debate remains out of public view, Republican opponents of
sampling have no incentive to compromise with the Administration. Republicans believe that
sampling in the census will result in more Democratic seats in Congress and in state legislatures
across the country. Because they are certain that voters are unaware of the census battle, there
is no political incentive to make a deal. See Editorial, First, Save the Census, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,
1999, at A22 (noting that the census debate is too important to be resolved by the Census
Bureau and congressional committees and imploring President Clinton and House Speaker
Dennis Hastert to “step it up” and get involved in the dispute).
247. See id. (claiming that the census issue is “fundamentally political”).
248. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the states are not bound constitutionally to use any
population data in particular when drawing congressional and state legislative districts).
249. As one redistricting expert characterized the states’ politically sensitive decisions:
“Redistricting is already the purest of all political blood sports. The Court’s ruling just provides
another layer of uncertainty . . . .” See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (quoting
Tim Storey, a redistricting expert at the National Conference of State Legislatures).
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state legislative districts.250 A decision to use the data compiled for
the purpose of apportioning seats in the House likely will result in
little change in the manner in which districts are drawn.251 Such a
decision would give the negative effects of the differential
undercount problem at least ten additional years of life.252 But a
decision to use the data compiled through the use of statistical
sampling could eliminate much of the harm wrought by the
differential undercount in a particular state.253 If enough states elect
to use the adjusted data to redraw their congressional and state
legislative districts, the negative effects of the differential undercount
on the entire nation would be lessened significantly.254 Hence,
decisions at the state level will go a long way in determining the
impact of any use of statistical sampling in the census.
C. The Congress
Congressional importance in the census battle stems from its
appropriations power—Congress’s constitutional prerogative to
either appropriate or withhold funds for government programs.255
Significantly, the power to enact laws—the traditional mechanism by
which Congress makes its will known—gives Congress little sway in
this battle because the President has promised to veto any legislation
banning the use of statistical sampling in the census.256 Thus, the fate
of the Administration’s plan hinges on whether Congress will
appropriate funds for the Census Bureau to conduct a census with
two sets of population data.
With the focus of census observers on the impending battle over
funding, there are two ways that the Administration could prevail in

250. See id. (explaining the political considerations that will play a role in these decisions).
251. But see supra Part I.C (explaining how the direct contact method of census-taking has
resulted in a disproportionate undercount of minorities in every census since 1940).
252. Significantly, the Census Bureau does not believe that it can improve accuracy through
traditional methods of physical enumeration. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 7
(calling it “fruitless” to attempt to remedy the differential undercount with the direct contact
method of census-taking). Thus, a decision by a state to use the data compiled for
apportionment will be a decision to use data that misstates the population of racial minorities,
and the problems with regard to political representation that result from the differential
undercount will persist. See MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS, supra note 1, at 35.
253. See supra Part III.C (describing the potential shift in political representation from
suburban neighborhoods to urban neighborhoods, where the undercount traditionally has
been highest).
254. See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (stating that “California sampling
could add one more congressional seat to Democratic-leaning Hispanic neighborhoods”).
255. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (stating that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by law”).
256. See Holmes, supra note 231, at A18 (quoting President Clinton’s letter to Rep.
Gephardt (D-Mo.) in which he promised to veto any law prohibiting the use of sampling).
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its effort to remedy the differential undercount problems through
the use of sampling. First, a politically weak Republican majority in
Congress could cave in to the politically popular President in a
showdown over the best way to conduct the census.257 Second,
Republican opponents of sampling in Congress could come to view
the differential undercount problem as a serious problem and join
the Administration in its efforts.258 For Republicans to make this
determination they would have to believe that the use of sampling in
the census will not be a boon to Democrats.259 Such a determination
is not necessarily unfounded.260 Indeed, many political observers
believe that African-Americans and other minorities are becoming
more receptive to the message of the Republican Party.261 With this
view in mind, Republicans in Congress should support the
Administration’s plan to count racial minorities in the 2000 census
accurately, and should implore its congressional candidates to fight
hard for the votes of minority communities in coming elections.
CONCLUSION
The fact that every American census of the last sixty years has
undercounted racial minorities at a rate disproportionate to whites
has significant implications for our democracy.262 This systematic
257. Compare Editorial, First, Save the Census, supra note 246, at A22 (calling the battle over
appropriations for the census “a game of chicken,” in which the first party to “flinch at the
approach of a possible government shutdown” will lose), with Editorial, Taking the Census Two
Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at A26 (claiming that “Republicans will balk at the two–track
proposal, but accuracy, fairness and the Census Act demand it”).
258. The editorial pages of The Washington Post and The New York Times have directed
Congress to realize the gravity of the differential undercount problem and to endorse the use of
sampling. See Editorial, First, Save the Census, supra note 246, at A22 (“The opponents [of
sampling] who fear manipulation are engaging in a form of manipulation of their own if they
compel the undercount that they know will otherwise occur. To leave the vulnerable in society
undercounted, underrepresented and without the funds to which they are entitled is especially
unfair.”); Editorial, Taking the Census Two Ways, supra note 257, at A26 (stating that “accuracy,
fairness, and the Census Act” demand the use of sampling).
259. See Dao, supra note 187, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (noting that many political scientists
and demographers discount the predictions that Democrats will gain greatly if sampling is used
in the census because these experts believe that elections turn more on voter turnout than
redistricting).
260. See id. (explaining that “creative Republican line drawing” in the states could also
prevent the creation of many new majority Democratic congressional and state legislative
districts).
261. The popularity of Texas Governor George W. Bush demonstrates that Republicans can
win the votes of minority groups. See Dan Balz, Bush Taking First Step Toward Run for President,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1999, at A1 (noting that Governor Bush received almost 50% of the
Hispanic vote and 25% of the African-American vote while winning re-election in November of
1998).
262. See supra Part I.B (describing the differential undercount problem and its effects on the
distribution of funds under government programs and the political representation of
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undercount results in an unjust deprivation of political power.263 The
Administration recognized this problem and sought to produce a
more accurate census through the use of a statistical method known
as sampling.264 The Administration’s plan has the support of the
scientific community and it is widely believed that it will produce a
more accurate census than the traditional headcount method.265
Nonetheless, the Census Act prohibits the use of statistical sampling
in tabulating population information for the purpose of apportioning
seats in the House of Representatives. Thus, the Supreme Court
affirmed a district court decision to enjoin the Administration from
using sampling for the purpose of apportionment.266 The Court’s
ruling notwithstanding, the Administration still can significantly
lessen the ill effects of the differential undercount by using sampling
for other purposes.267 In the end, then, the viability of a census plan
that involves the use of sampling will be determined in the give-andtake of budget negotiations and the individual decisions of fifty state
governments across the country.

undercounted communities).
263. See supra Part III.B (explaining the effect of the undercount on the representation of
undercounted communities in Congress and state legislatures).
264. See supra Part I.C (describing the ways in which the Administration plans to use
sampling in the 2000 census to remedy the differential undercount problem).
265. Indeed, the National Academy of Sciences, Panel on Methods concluded that the
“[d]ifferential undercount cannot be reduced to acceptable levels without the use of integrated
coverage measurement and the statistical methods associated with it.” REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 8, at 8.
266. See supra Parts II.A-C (explaining those decisions).
267. See supra Part III (explaining that the Court’s decision does not prohibit the use of
sampling-adjusted census figures for distributing funds under population-based government
programs or for redistricting by the states).

